Foreign Policy Brief on the Use of Private Military Companies in Iraq
The use of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in Iraq is a central question of the U.S. efforts in that country. As of 2003, the private military industry represents $100 billion annually, and 100,000 contractors are currently employed in Iraq, a tenfold increase from the first Persian Gulf War in 1991. Given the Obama Administration's mostly accepting posture toward the continued use of PMCs, it seems clear that they will continue to make up a significant portion of the U.S.'s overseas security forces. Current policy regarding these companies, however, is flawed. The main problem is the lack of legislative oversight in the process of awarding contracts, which leads to lax legal standards for contractors operating in combat sites, negative press for the government, and higher costs. By increasing transparency in the process, the U.S. will be able to improve its image abroad, which will greatly abet the peace process in Iraq by prompting greater cooperation from coalition partners and the Iraqi government itself, and cut down spending for a more streamlined budget, which will have domestic benefits.
Problems With the Use of PMCs
The current standards of PMC use are not sustainable for the U.S. Existing policy has numerous problems attached to it, the three most critical of which will be presented here. First, the legal status of PMCs has drawn much critical attention. As per Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 17, signed by then-outgoing head of the CPA, L. Paul Bremer, contractors working for PMCs "shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their Contracts, including licensing and registering employees, businesses and corporations." This stance has drawn sharp criticism that this places contractors above the law, though the Order does go on to state that PMCs operating in the country must comply with CPA directives. Opponents are also troubled by the fact that PMCs are not under the purview of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In a 2005 Q&A Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld attempted to refute such criticism, indicating that "the UN Resolution and the Iraqi laws, as well as U.S. procedures and laws govern behavior in that country depending on who the individual is and what he's doing." However, this does not change the fact that contract forces are not bound by the same strict standards applied to regular U.S. military forces. Further, unlike regular military forces, are not subject to legislative oversight, despite the fact that the high cost of these firms comes from congressionally appropriated funds via the Defense Department. Additionally, there is contention that the use of PMCs violates the Geneva Conventions. Protocol I Addition to the Geneva Conventions Article 47.c stipulates that contractors who engage in combat operations are classified as "mercenaries," considered unlawful combatants, and lose their right to prisoner-of-war status if captured. Given the value that American places on the rule of law, this issue above all the others should be of primary focus in adjusting U.S. policy in this matter.
Second, partly as a result of this foggy legal situation, PMCs have become a much greater focus for war journalists, and very little of the attention is positive. A number of books have been released that are critical of the use of PMCs, including investigative journalist Jeremy Scahill's Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army and Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution P.W. Singer's Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. PMCs have been involved in a number of scandals in Iraq, including the Abu Ghraib prison abuse incident, in which the U.S. Army found that 36% of the incidents involved contractors and that none of those implicated faced prosecution, and the death of 17 Iraqi civilians by Blackwater guards in 2007 that led to the cancellation of that firms contracts with both the Iraqi government and the U.S. State Department. Such negative focus, which is only compounded by the questionable legal situation outlined previously, threatens to undermine the U.S.'s position in Iraq by attracting criticism from coalition partners and galvanizing insurgent forces.
Third and finally, the cost of relying on PMCs is steep. As mentioned above, the privatized military industry represents $100 billion annually. Of course, not all of this cost is delegated toward operations in Iraq, but it should be understood that PMCs provide services akin to the functions of military forces at a much higher cost. This draws attention to non-military services provided by PMCs, which includes sanitation, food preparation, and others that U.S. military forces used to perform themselves. The situation that results is one in which the government is paying both salaries to soldiers directly and premiums for services from PMCs that soldier salaries used to cover, resulting in an inflated budget. Concerns have also arisen over suspected contractor fraud on multiple fronts, including overcharging for services and selling faulty equipment and arms. There is also a more hidden but no less worrisome cost - discrepancies in salaries between regular government military forces and PMCs means that many qualified soldiers may be tempted to become contractors instead. This has reportedly affected U.S. Special Operations Forces (including the Green Berets, Navy Seals, and Air Force para-rescue crews), the British SAS, and other global units. This loss of specialized and elite forces could adversely affect the U.S.'s ability to effectively meet tactical challenges throughout the world by making the military alarmingly dependent on independent forces loyal to the contract rather than the nation and beyond effective accountability. Moreover, this drain means that U.S. citizens are not necessarily being pulled out of harm's way by employing PMCs as many contractors are former members of the military - Americans will still be injured and killed.
New U.S. Policy Regarding PMCs in Iraq: Options and Recommendations
The Obama Administration faces several options for moving forward in regards to PMCs present in Iraq. The first, of course, is to do nothing. This solution entails continued reliance on PMCs for security operations in Iraq with no revisions to current standards of distributing these contracts. For those reasons outlined above, this is not an attractive approach. The costs are too high and the controversy is too substantial to simply ignore. The status quo is in no way a desirable option in this situation. Conversely, the second option - removing all PMCs from combat operations in Iraq - is not realistic. For one thing, barring a massive breach of trust on the part of the PMCs such as the 2007 incident involving Blackwater, the contracts themselves must be honored until expiration. Another consideration, though, is the safety of the "principal" - those individuals that these security forces are hired to protect, usually State Department officials. If PMCs were removed from Iraq, then U.S. Army forces would have to be tasked with protecting these civilian officials from insurgent attacks, which would divert the Army's attention and potentially hamper its ability to carry out combat operations.
The answer, then, lies in a middle way between an acceptance of status quo and a radical departure from existing policy. This would involve continuing the use of PMCs while taking steps to address the problems outlined above. Chief among any reforms enacted by the U.S. would be a tightening of legal standards placed on PMCs and contractors operating in Iraq (and elsewhere). The reason for this is twofold. First, the legal standards under which PMCs operate are the most direct way that the government can affect changes aside from discontinuing their contracts. The benefits of such a move include not only an effective deterrent to incidents such as the civilian deaths in 2007 but also the introduction of legislative oversight which is sorely lacking in the current system. Steps toward this have already been taken, so this is merely a matter of building on the foundations already in place. The 2007 Defense Budget appropriation (H.R. 5122 of the 109th Congress) amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice under Sec. 552 to allow for prosecution of contractors deployed in a "declared war or contingency operation." Though there are problems with this legislation - unintended consequences include the possibility of a court-martial against other civilians in a combat site, such as journalists - it is nevertheless the beginning of what could be a positive change in the use of PMCs in Iraq. Second, such a move would allow the government to handle the other factors described despite the fact that it does not have direct control over them. While increased oversight and prosecution of PMC contractors that violate the UCMJ would not necessarily decrease the negative press coverage of PMCs themselves, for example, it would certainly improve the coverage of the U.S.'s use thereof by making the government more obviously vigilant in upholding legal standards. Congressional oversight of the awarding of Defense and State Department contracts with PMCs would additionally result in fewer cases of fraud and more competitive contract offers. The money saved could then be applied to a myriad of other causes, including bolstering domestic programs, paying off the national debt, or addressing the problem of recruitment drain by allowing the government to offer monetary incentives to keep elite units within governmental military forces. For these reasons, it is highly recommended that Congress move quickly to establish more rigid oversight standards in dealing with PMC contracts. Such a move would positively impact the government's ability to fulfill the mission in Iraq as well as meet related domestic challenges.
1,601 words / 5 pages
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